Why is shame not a virtue

Not registered? Sign up. Publications Pages Publications Pages. Recently viewed 0 Save Search. Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Volume Find in Worldcat. Go to page:. Your current browser may not support copying via this button. Search within book. Being ashamed of oneself is a virtue of the humble, of the man or woman who is humble.

Raymond and K. This article addresses these interpretations by exploring the thought of St. Felt in an appropriate degree with respect to a truly disgraceful action be it one already done or one yet to be done , shame is morally praiseworthy and, as such, can be called a virtue in the loosest sense of the term. In suggesting this, I go beyond what Aquinas [End Page ] explicitly says, though the idea is latent in his biblical commentaries.

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Shame should not be described as a virtue; for it is more like a feeling than a state of character. It is defined, at any rate, as a kind of fear of dishonour, and produces an effect similar to that produced by fear of danger; for people who feel disgraced blush, and those who fear death turn pale.

Both, therefore, seem to be in a sense bodily conditions, which is thought to be characteristic of feeling rather than of a state of character.